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Counting What Matters: Privatization, 
People with Disabilities, and the Cost of 
Low-Wage Work 
Ellen Dannin† 
On March 26, 2007, Representative James Sensenbrenner, 
Jr., spoke of the need to restore the Americans with Disabilities 
Act’s (ADA)1 “‘clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination on the basis of disability’” by 
legislatively overruling decisions by the Supreme Court that 
have “‘chipped away at some of the ADA’s broad protections.’”2 
His thoughts were echoed on August 13, 2007, when Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Chair Naomi 
Earp stated that “[f]ederal agencies ‘are not doing well’ in the 
area of hiring people with targeted disabilities . . . . ‘The[] 
numbers have declined . . . . We have to figure out how to re-
cruit people with disabilities, especially those with mental dis-
abilities.’”3 Earp saw bias as the reason people with disabilities 
were not being employed by the federal government. 
 
†  Fannie Weiss Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, 
Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A., University 
of Michigan; J.D., University of Michigan. This Article is supported by a sum-
mer research stipend from Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson 
School of Law. I have also been the beneficiary of comments from my Penn 
State colleagues through the faculty forum administered by Jeffrey Kahn and 
from Robert Baillie, Carrie Griffin Bassas, Katrice Bridges, Richard Lempert, 
and Emily Melvin. This Article is a first step in a larger book project. As a re-
sult, its focus is on laying the groundwork for a more detailed examination of 
all these factors. Copyright © 2008 by Ellen Dannin. 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 
(2000). 
 2. Press Release, New York Law School, Congressman Sensenbrenner to 
Speak on Improving the Americans with Disabilities Act at New York Law 
School, March 26, http://www.nyls.edu/pages/5468.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 
2008) (quoting Rep. James Sensenbrenner). The speech may be found at http:// 
www.nyls.edu/pdfs/SensenbrennerSpeech.pdf. 
 3. Tripp Baltz, Federal Sector ‘Not Doing Well’ in Hiring People with 
Disabilities, EEOC Chair Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A-7 (Aug. 
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Representative Sensenbrenner and EEOC Chair Earp are 
correct that disability should not be a bar to securing a good 
job. They are also correct that the federal government should 
be a model employer, continuing its long tradition of employing 
capable workers who were discriminated against. However, 
discrimination does not fully explain why the government does 
not employ more people with disabilities today.  
One important factor that has been completely overlooked 
is privatization. At least some of those federal jobs have been 
lost because the government has contracted the work out to 
private companies. That is why no federal employees with dis-
abilities currently work in the mailrooms of the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS), though before privatization federal em-
ployees with disabilities held roughly thirty-five percent of 
those jobs.4 In fact, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has targeted for privatization many federal jobs that 
were or currently are being performed by people with disabili-
ties because it has defined these jobs as not inherently govern-
mental. Defining a job as commercial—and thus not inherently 
governmental—means the work may be contracted out to the 
private sector.5  
The classification of work as either commercial or inherent-
ly governmental seems logical, and the conclusion that only 
commercial activities may be contracted out seems reasonable. 
The impact on the work performed by people with serious dis-
abilities can be seen only by paying attention to the details 
within the very long memoranda that govern federal privatiza-
tion and that assign jobs to one category or another. An inhe-
rently governmental function is a “function that is so intimate-
ly related to the public interest as to require performance by 
Federal Government employees.”6 In a 1992 Policy Letter, the 
OMB defined inherently governmental functions as “those ac-
tivities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying 
 
14, 2007) (quoting Naomi Earp, Chair, Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission). 
 4. In re Dep’t of the Treasury Internal Revenue Serv. and Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union (Treasury Employees I), No. 04 FSIP 35 (July 21, 2004), Fed. 
Serv. Imp. Pan. Rel. No. 470, at 1 n.1 (Aug. 14, 2004), available at 2004 WL 
1656548. 
 5. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, OMB POLICY LETTER NO. 92-1, INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNC-
TIONS (1992) [hereinafter OMB POLICY LETTER NO. 92-1], available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/policy_letters/92-1_092392.html. 
 6. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 
§ 5(2), 112 Stat. 2382, 2385 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501(2) (2000)).  
DANNIN_4fmt 5/24/2008 11:37 AM 
1350 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1348 
 
Government authority or the making of value judgments in 
making decisions for the Government.”7 Functions defined as 
not inherently governmental—and thus candidates for privati-
zation—“include [those] that are primarily ministerial and in-
ternal in nature, such as building security; mail operations; op-
eration of cafeterias; housekeeping; facilities operations and 
maintenance, warehouse operations, motor vehicle fleet man-
agement and operations, or other routine electrical or mechani-
cal services.”8 
When the IRS contracted out its mailroom work9 to Servi-
ceSource, a nonprofit organization that “provides job training 
and support services to . . . people with disabilities,”10 the OMB 
was assisted by two nonprofit organizations, the National In-
dustries for the Severely Handicapped (NISH)11 and National 
Industries for the Blind (NIB).12 The OMB was also assisted by 
the government agency that works closely with NISH and NIB, 
now known as “AbilityOne,” but formerly the Committee for 
Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled.13 As 
a result, agencies whose stated purpose is to secure work for 
people with disabilities actually destroyed jobs held by people 
with disabilities. 
Even though the privatization of the IRS mailroom work 
affected only a few government jobs, it involved people, organi-
zations, and events that provide a useful context for under-
standing how privatization functions and for identifying the 
 
 7. OMB POLICY LETTER NO. 92-1, supra note 5, ¶ 5. 
 8. Id. (emphasis added). 
 9. See infra Part I.A for a detailed description of this event. 
 10. ServiceSource Network, Welcome to the ServiceSource Network, 
http://www.ourpeoplework.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 11. National Institute for the Severely Handicapped, Home Page, http:// 
www.nish.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). NISH describes itself as a nonprofit 
agency that supports other nonprofit agencies that participate in the Abili-
tyOne Program. Id. 
 12. National Industries for the Blind, About NIB, http://www.nib.org (fol-
low “About NIB” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). NIB is also a nonprofit 
agency operating under the AbilityOne program, and “work[s] to deliver quali-
ty products on time at competitive rates.” Id. 
 13. This agency receives its mandate from the Javits-Wagner-O’Day 
(JWOD) Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 46–48c (2000 & Supp. IV 2006). The AbilityOne 
(formerly JWOD) Program “provides employment opportunities for nearly 
48,000 Americans who are blind or have other severe disabilities by orches-
trating government purchases of products and services provided by nonprofit 
agencies employing such individuals throughout the country.” JWOD, A Brief 
History of the AbilityOne Program, http://www.abilityone.gov/jwod/about_us/ 
about_us.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
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true costs of contracting out federal public-sector work. Privati-
zation proponents justify privatization as providing higher 
quality work at lower cost.14 Under the Bush administration, 
the OMB has strongly advocated for privatization in reports 
projecting cost savings and improvements in service, although 
follow-up surveys to verify projected savings are notably ab-
sent.15 
In its 2002 report, the General Accounting Office, now the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), explained the process 
of contracting out federal work as involving cost comparisons to 
guarantee that the public would save money and receive higher 
quality services. The privatization can proceed either by direct 
conversion or cost comparison under Circular A-76.16 Under the 
direct conversion approach, commercial activities are trans-
ferred from the government to private contractors without a 
cost-comparison study. This process typically applies to small 
transfers involving ten or fewer civilians. Most job transfers to 
the private sector, however, require a cost-comparison study. 
Under the cost-comparison approach, unless the privatization 
of government work will “save at least $10 million or 10 percent 
of the personnel costs of in-house performance (whichever is 
less),” the jobs remain in the public sector.17  
The process the GAO has laid out sounds reasonable. How-
ever, as in the case of the IRS mailroom, the GAO did not al-
ways make meaningful cost and quality comparisons. As a re-
sult, there has been no guarantee that the public would receive 
the promised improvements. In addition, even when there have 
been competitions, their narrow focus has included costs that 
are trivial when compared to real costs that are excluded and 
 
 14. See Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Publici-
zation, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 117–18 (2005). 
 15. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: CONDUCTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETI-
TION IN A REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER 2 (2003) [hereinafter OMB, 
COMPETITIVE SOURCING], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
procurement/comp_sourcing_072403.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EX-
ECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA 
17–18 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/ 
mgmt.pdf. The OMB website refers to the latter as “an aggressive strategy for 
improving the management of the Federal government.” Office of Manage-
ment. & Budget, President’s Management Agenda, http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/omb/budintegration/pma_index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 16. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO-02-866T, IMPROVING THE SOURCING DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOV-
ERNMENT 2 (2002); infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 17. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
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thus ignored. Finally, there is no evidence that post-
privatization reviews to assess whether cost and quality projec-
tions have been met, are performed. Future policy decisions 
and decisions to privatize are therefore made based on theory 
and not fact. 
If we are to properly and fairly assess the cost of federal 
privatization, we must first identify and include all of its costs. 
We must include all costs related to the privatization process as 
well as costs arising from the consequences of privatization. Al-
though this may seem obvious if a fair assessment is to be 
achieved, federal agencies have been directed to exclude impor-
tant costs, while other costs have been effectively excluded 
since they are not included in required reporting. For example, 
the OMB’s 2006 memorandum sets out costs that agencies are 
to report through the Competitive Sourcing Tracking System 
(CSTS) for the OMB’s use in its reports to Congress.18 
The reports are to exclude costs incurred in fiscal years 
other than those in which a privatization competition was com-
pleted. Certain identified costs used to prepare for privatization 
can be included only if they were “incurred after public an-
nouncement of the competition,” such as the “costs of consul-
tants or contractors who participated in the conduct of the 
competitions”; “costs of travel, training, or other incremental 
expenses directly attributed to the conduct of the reported com-
petitions”; and the cost of work “incurred as part of conducting 
the competition (i.e., any staff hired specifically to work on a 
particular competition or competitions or fill behind employees 
temporarily working on a competition or overtime costs (where 
overtime costs are tracked)).”19 Excluded costs included those 
incurred before the competition was publicly announced by 
regular employees who worked “on the competition during reg-
ular working hours,” general competition oversight costs “such 
as competitive sourcing office staff or general training provided 
to employees that is not considered a part of the competition,” 
and the cost of full-time equivalent employees or “contract sup-
port associated with specific competitions or out-of-pocket (in-
cremental) costs for conducting individual competitions.”20 Per-
 
 18. Memorandum from Paul A. Denett, Adm’r, Office of Fed. Procurement 
Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, M-07-01, Report to Congress on FY 2006 Competitive Sourcing Ef-
forts (Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Denett Memo], available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-01.pdf. 
 19. Id. Attachment A, at 5–6. 
 20. Id. Attachment A, at 6, 10. 
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haps most troubling was the direction not to include “transition 
costs (e.g., Voluntary Early Retirement Authority or Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Program costs, moving expenses, etc.).”21  
Some of these excluded costs may have been intended for 
inclusion elsewhere under the system set out in the memo and 
those it incorporates by reference. However, the complex sys-
tem of segregating costs under the system set out in the OMB 
memorandum makes it likely that excluded costs will be missed 
entirely. In addition, with the reporting system changing each 
year, it is likely that no provisions will be made for fully includ-
ing all costs. It is also possible that the problems that may lead 
to an understatement of obviously relevant costs were inten-
tional. Both the covering memorandum and its Attachment A 
make it clear that the OMB wanted to portray privatization as 
a success story in its government-wide report to Congress.22 
To be fair, reporting on all federal privatization undertak-
ings is a daunting task. The level of information is so great that 
difficult decisions have to be made about what to include and 
exclude. In addition, while there are similarities among agen-
cies, the nature of their individual missions makes compiling a 
uniform report difficult. Furthermore, the agencies and the 
OMB have to respond to commands from Congress and the Ex-
ecutive that are influenced by politics and fluctuating public 
concerns. The 2006 OMB memorandum bears the hallmarks of 
those influences. Furthermore, this process has taken place 
within a government that has declining numbers of employees 
to manage and then report on the process. In his 2006 study, 
The New True Size of Government, Paul C. Light reported that 
in 2005 government work was performed by 1,872,000 civil ser-
vants, 7,634,000 contract employees, and 2,892,000 employees 
on grant jobs.23 In other words, regular employees comprise on-
ly about fifteen percent of those performing government work.24 
According to Light, this is “the most significant increase in re-
cent history in the largely hidden workforce of contractors and 
grantees who work for the federal government.”25 
 
 21. Id. Attachment A, at 7. 
 22. Id. (encouraging each agency “to provide OMB with one or two brief 
narrative summaries describing competitions successfully completed in FY 
2006 and the practices used to achieve results”). 
 23. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE NEW TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 11 (2006), 
available at http://wagner.nyu.edu/performance/files/True_Size.pdf. 
 24. Id. These figures exclude military personnel (1,436,000 employees) 
and postal service jobs (767,000 employees). Id. 
 25. Id. at 1 (stating that the true size of the federal workforce when con-
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If we are to understand the process and costs of privatiza-
tion, we need to examine them on a smaller scale. The IRS 
mailroom privatization process provides that smaller scale. It 
offers an opportunity to identify all sources of costs, including 
excluded or overlooked costs, and at last develop the capacity to 
assess privatization. The IRS mailroom privatization is ideal 
for a number of reasons. First, the IRS privatization involves 
many events and issues that are typical of federal privatiza-
tion, although it also has unique qualities. It most differs in 
that not all federal privatization involves a contractor that is a 
private nonprofit organization. However, although less dramat-
ically visible than private contractors such as military contrac-
tors, nonprofit organizations do actively seek federal work, as 
the existence of NISH, NIB, and AbilityOne attest. Thus, al-
though not all cost factors are present in the privatization of 
the IRS mailroom, the conditions under which the IRS mail-
room was privatized provide a useful means to identify a wide 
range of overlooked privatization costs. Second, enough time 
has passed since the IRS mailroom privatization was an-
nounced and executed that we can identify relevant forces that 
affect the process of federal privatization. Third, the small 
number of employees and jobs involved makes it easier to track 
costs, benefits, impacts, and other consequences of federal pri-
vatization.  
This Article begins with a discussion of the privatization of 
the IRS mailroom and then moves to an examination of the in-
frastructure that led to its privatization. Next, it explores the 
movement of nonprofit organizations into the world of privati-
zation. Finally, this Article examines the nonprofit organiza-
tion that was given the mailroom work. Within each of these 
perspectives, the question is asked: what are the costs and who 
bears them? 
I.  CONTRACTING OUT THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE’S MAILROOMS   
A. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO PRIVATIZATION 
On April 15, 2003, the IRS announced its plan to transfer 
work in IRS mailrooms across the country directly to a private, 
 
tractors and grantees are counted is 14.6 million employees, an increase over 
the 12.1 million employees in 2002, and 11 million in 1999). Moreover, in 2005 
contract employees accounted for 7.6 million jobs, a 2.5 million increase since 
2002 and a 3.2 million increase since 1999. Id. 
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nonprofit contractor named ServiceSource.26 This “direct con-
version” meant that the mailroom workers were given no op-
portunity to demonstrate they could do higher quality work at 
lower cost than the private contractor.27 Under limited circums-
tances such direct conversions have been permitted in a range 
of federal privatizations, with the right to do so varying from 
year to year, depending on changes made to the law and regu-
lations. In fact, whether the IRS had the right to directly con-
vert the mailroom work, rather than engage in a competition to 
determine whether private or public workers should perform 
the work, was a central issue in the litigation over privatizing 
the mailroom work. The IRS argued that a direct conversion 
was legal under the law at the time it announced it would con-
tract out the work.28 Ultimately the court decided that the IRS 
could not legally privatize individual employees’ work without a 
competition, based on the law in effect in fiscal year 2004 when 
the jobs were actually contracted out.29  
While this decision could have required the IRS to bring 
the work back in-house, that did not happen for a number of 
reasons that would likely arise in other privatization scenarios. 
These appear to be considerations that likely affected the par-
ties’ decisions after the case was issued. First, the district court 
decision was issued in 2006, nearly two years after the work 
had been transferred to the private sector. As a result, logistic-
al problems arose that would have made it difficult to reestab-
lish the mailrooms and rehire the workers. Many employees 
had taken early retirement or other offers and were not availa-
ble or did not return. Second, the decision was a district court 
decision. The parties could have appealed, but decided it was in 
their mutual interest to settle the case with small payments to 
the few employees who had not taken other offers. Factors that 
probably affected the settlement decision include the time and 
money already invested, the complexity of the law and facts, 
and the need to move on. Third, the IRS could have immediate-
ly taken the steps necessary to reprivatize the work, or the 
OMB could have issued changes in the regulatory process for 
privatizations. Thus, attempting to return the work to the pub-
lic sector may have been an exercise in futility.  
 
 26. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. IRS (Treasury Employees II ), No. 
Civ. A. 04-CV-0820, 2006 WL 416161, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006) (mem.). 
 27. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 2. 
 28. Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161, at *6. 
 29. Id. at *7. 
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Thus, three years before Representative Sensenbrenner 
and EEOC Chair Earp criticized the lack of jobs for people with 
disabilities, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) 
strongly objected to the IRS mailroom privatization based on its 
impact on the current mailroom employees and on job prospects 
for people with disabilities. In NTEU President Colleen Kelley’s 
words, “‘this type of action is contributing to the decline in dis-
abled federal workers who often have a harder time finding 
employment in the private sector. To deny these employees 
even the opportunity to compete for their jobs is a travesty.’”30 
Despite these objections, over the year and one-half follow-
ing its April 15, 2003 announcement, the IRS gradually shifted 
mailroom work to ServiceSource while eligible mailroom em-
ployees retired or took other buyout offers. Meanwhile, the 
mailroom employees’ union, NTEU, fought before the Federal 
Service Impasses Panel (FSIP)31 and in federal district court32 
to keep the jobs. On July 21, 2004, fifteen months after the IRS 
announced the privatization, the FSIP ruled that the IRS could 
proceed with a “reduction in force” (RIF) of the mailroom em-
ployees.33 By that time, twenty-seven of the seventy-eight fed-
eral employees who had been working in the mailrooms in Oct-
ober 2003, when the IRS finally signed a contract with 
ServiceSource, had left.34 By December 10, 2004, no federal 
employees were left to perform IRS mailroom work.35  
The IRS has made various claims about the fate of the em-
ployees. It is clear that a number lost their jobs as a result of 
the RIF notices, including through taking early retirement and 
buyout opportunities. The IRS has given varying numbers, 
however, so it is not clear how many fell into each category. For 
example, the IRS has claimed that either two or as many as 
 
 30. Louis C. LaBrecque, NTEU Files Summary Judgment Motion to Stop 
IRS Mailroom Job Outsourcing, 42 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2082, at 
1053 (Nov. 9, 2004) (relaying NTEU President Kelley’s comments on an EEOC 
study finding “a decline of almost 20 percent in the number of federal em-
ployees with disabilities”). 
 31. In re Dep’t of the Treasury Internal Revenue Serv. and Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union (Treasury Employees I ), No. 04 FSIP 35 (July 21, 2004), Fed. 
Serv. Imp. Pan. Rel. No. 470 (Aug. 14, 2004), available at 2004 WL 1656548. 
 32. Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161. 
 33. Treasury Employees I, at 8. 
 34. LaBrecque, supra note 30. 
 35. Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161, at *5.  
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twelve employees were given positions with the contractor, 
ServiceSource.36  
B. THE COST TO THE IRS WORKERS OF LOSING THE MAILROOM 
WORK 
Across the federal government, privatization has moved 
jobs from the public sector to the private sector. In the case of 
the IRS mailroom, ServiceSource, a nonprofit organization who 
focuses on disability issues, acted as the force to transfer jobs 
from the public to the private sector. In one sense, contracting 
out work in the IRS mailrooms merely replaced federal workers 
with disabilities with other people, at least some of whom were 
people with disabilities. Although this transfer may seem to be 
a wash, it was not.  
First, as a philosophical and moral matter, people, even 
those who perform low-skilled jobs, are human beings and not 
mere fungible items. Second, the federal workers lost jobs that 
gave them the dignity and autonomy that work provides. They 
had jobs with benefits, civil service protection, and union repre-
sentation. Identifying what they had and lost as a result of pri-
vatization matters both in terms of personal and social costs. 
Furthermore, if those who performed the work through the 
ServiceSource contract lacked these benefits and protections, 
the private job was of lower worth. It is, therefore, important to 
identify what these government jobs provided in addition to 
pay.37  
At best, these mailroom jobs were nothing but low-paid 
jobs in either the public or private sector, no matter who held 
them. But the process of privatization did more than merely 
transfer jobs from the public to the private sector. It trans-
formed low-wage government jobs with benefits, civil service 
protections, and union representation into low-wage jobs that 
not only lack these protections but are often structured in a 
way that takes away the job holder’s ability to be self-
supporting.38 Certainly, the crisis created when the IRS an-
 
 36. LaBrecque, supra note 30. 
 37. See E-mail from Rob Shriver, Esq., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 
to Ellen Dannin, Professor of Law, Pa. State Univ., The Dickinson Sch. of Law 
(Sept. 28, 2007, 13:11 EST) (on file with author) (stating that most of the af-
fected mailroom employees were grades four and five on the federal pay scale, 
and explaining the benefits that such pay grades provide). 
 38. For example, these jobs were divided among many individuals, and 
the work was provided as therapy rather than work. See infra Part IV.B. 
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nounced the mailroom privatization demonstrated the value of 
union representation for these workers, of having someone will-
ing and able to stand by one’s side in the fight to retain the job. 
In other words, the effort to identify the costs of privatization 
and to better identify who pays these costs must include the 
people who lose these low-wage jobs and the inventory of what 
they lose. These personal costs are easy to see once brought to 
our attention. However, they are not normally included among 
the costs of privatization. 
C. THE TAXPAYERS’ COSTS  
Ultimately, the taxpayers have borne a large portion of the 
costs associated with the immediate contracting process. Our 
taxes subsidize displaced workers directly and indirectly while 
they remain unemployed.39 In addition to unemployment bene-
fits and programs to help displaced workers find new work, we 
must add public money that supports programs, such as those 
provided by ServiceSource when people with disabilities or oth-
er special needs are involved.  
The two lawsuits filed by the NTEU to stop the privatiza-
tion also generated costs borne by taxpayers. The NTEU is not 
unique in taking these actions. Indeed, it is not unusual for un-
ions, and certainly federal employee unions, to fight privatiza-
tion through litigation, lobbying, and public campaigns.40 In 
identifying the costs of privatization, we must, therefore, add 
the costs of litigation expenses incurred by the Treasury De-
partment and the NTEU in their battles over the legality of the 
decision to privatize these jobs. We, the public, pay for those 
courtrooms as buildings and for their physical and human in-
frastructure. Although most people are probably aware that 
these processes and costs exist, people may not be aware that 
they might be associated with privatization.  
It is even less likely that many people are aware of the 
huge governmental and legal apparatus in place to contract out 
 
 39. See, e.g., BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDU-
STRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 75–78 (1982). 
 40. Materials, press releases, position papers, and resources to fight pri-
vatization may be found at the websites of unions such as the National Trea-
sury Employees Union (NTEU), see NTEU, Press Room, www.nteu.org/ 
PressKits (last visited Apr. 18, 2008), the American Federation of State, Coun-
ty, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), see AFSCME, Privatization, http:// 
www.afscme.org/issues/76.cfm (last visited Apr. 18, 2008), and the American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), see AFGE, Privatization, http:// 
www.afge.org/Index.cfm?page=Privatization (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
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federal jobs to the private sector. This apparatus exists in the 
OMB and in every federal agency. In addition, there are gov-
ernment entities, such as FedBizOpps.gov,41 that facilitate such 
transfers to the private sector by soliciting bids, a subject we 
will be discussing in the next Section.42  
Less obvious still is the impact that nonprofit organiza-
tions, organizations such as ServiceSource, which is heavily 
subsidized by public money,43 have in putting wage pressure on 
public- and private-sector jobs. That funding is discussed below, 
but it is fair to say that those subsidies are great enough to 
mean that, even had the IRS mailroom employees been allowed 
to compete with ServiceSource for their jobs, they would likely 
have lost. Public subsidies to nonprofit organizations include 
outright grants and tax deductions taken by their donors, and 
subsidies and grants.  
These subsidies affect more than the public sector and pub-
lic employment. They make it difficult for private-sector com-
petitors to compete with ServiceSource for work. ServiceSource 
not only knows that it is able to underbid its private competi-
tors based on price, it explicitly advertises this claim. For ex-
ample, ServiceSource’s magazine, Our People Work, included 
an endorsement from Bruce Wardinski, President and CEO of 
Barceló Crestline Corporation: “We bid the contract out against 
another commercial company and ServiceSource provided a 
more competitive bid. ServiceSource is now doing the document 
scanning work for us at a very cost efficient price.”44  
While ServiceSource promotes itself as a competitor in the 
private sector, it does not advertise that public subsidies help 
give it an edge over its competitors. However, this is certainly 
the case. For example, since 2001, Fairfax Imaging has donated 
its Quick Modules Software to ServiceSource’s Precision Im-
ages Document Scanning Division at no cost. ServiceSource 
says that this software “has made a drastic change in partici-
pants’ work abilities and productivity.”45 Private competitors of 
 
 41. Federal Business Opportunities, Home Page, http://www.fedbizopps 
.gov/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 42. See infra Part II.  
 43. See infra text accompanying notes 46 and 129.  
 44. ServiceSource Network Document Management Initiative Moves For-
ward, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria, Va.), Spring 
2005, at 13, available at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/ 
ServcesourceSpring05.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Precision Images Division and Fairfax Imaging Receive Assistive 
Technology Awards from NISH, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, 
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Fairfax Imaging would have to pay for that software. The dona-
tion Fairfax makes does not go unrewarded. As a donation to a 
501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, the Fairfax software entitles it 
to a tax deduction for each of those years.46 Thus, Service-
Source’s Precision Images Division receives a public subsidy 
that its competitors cannot get and that allows it to offer lower 
prices. 
When a highly subsidized nonprofit organization like Ser-
viceSource enters the private sector as a competitor, it becomes 
a force that can depress private-sector wages. As private-sector 
competitors lose bids, they may try to lower pay and benefits, 
subject to legal limits. If they are unable to continue in busi-
ness, their former employees join the ranks of the unemployed, 
leading to rising unemployment, which will in turn put more 
pressure on wages. Increased unemployment and wage pres-
sure have effects beyond the workplace and the workers who 
are immediately affected. Unemployed workers contribute less 
to the economy and require public subsidies, such as unem-
ployment payments.47 
Taken together, these are but a few of the nontrivial but 
invisible costs that, if accounted for, might far outweigh any 
savings to the public that even the most optimistic proponent 
would claim for privatization. These are public costs of the sys-
tem that exist even when it is functioning properly without 
failures, incompetence, or corruption—problems that continual-
ly bedevil privatization. 
II.  THE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT FORCED THE IRS TO 
PRIVATIZE ITS MAILROOM   
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL PRIVATIZATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The IRS mailroom privatization needs to be placed in the 
larger privatization context, including the infrastructure 
created under the George W. Bush administration and Republi-
can Congresses. The processes behind privatization are unfami-
liar to most people, and few know more about privatization 
 
Alexandria, Va.), Summer 2006, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework 
.org/files/ServcesourceSummer06.pdf. 
 46. See I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2007). 
 47. For detailed studies of the impact of unemployment, see BLUESTONE 
& HARRISON, supra note 39, and DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: IN-
VISIBLE IN AMERICA (2004). 
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than that it is supposed to deliver better performance at lower 
cost. Certainly, few know of the role played by the OMB in 
overseeing and regulating a process sufficiently powerful to 
cause the IRS to enter into a contract to privatize the mail-
room48 with such haste that it would take ten more months to 
agree to the specific terms of the privatization. 
The federal privatization infrastructure is sweeping, huge, 
and Byzantine and must have entailed enormous costs to con-
struct, maintain, administer, and upgrade. Its components em-
body the sort of tedious detail that most of us would rather 
avoid. However, it is impossible to understand why the IRS 
privatized the mailroom work and did so with such haste with-
out a basic sense of the OMB privatization infrastructure and 
the power of these tedious regulations and circulars. Starting 
from the OMB’s webpage,49 one can find links to the regula-
tions and circulars that regulate the process of privatization.50 
Circular A-76 governs the federal privatization process and is 
the most important of these circulars.51 The OMB’s webpage al-
so links to Results.gov,52 whose function is to aggressively pro-
mote privatization.  
One Results.gov initiative, begun in 2001, is a “manage-
ment scorecard” that rates individual agencies with green 
“stickers” for success, yellow for mixed results, and red for un-
satisfactory.53 As Results.gov explains, the system has evolved 
since it was developed in 2001; however, the basic structure 
remains the same. The scorecard ranks agencies on each of a 
number of detailed standards. “Under each of these standards, 
 
 48. Solicitation, Offer and Award Between the Internal Revenue Service 
and ServiceSource Inc., Contract No. NO-04-D-00005, Solicitation No. TIRNO-
03-R-00001 (Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Solicitation, Offer 
and Award]. 
 49. Office of Management & Budget, Welcome to OMB, http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/omb (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 50. Office of Management & Budget, OMB Circulars, http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 51. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Cir-
cular No. A-76 (Revised) (May 29, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.pdf. 
 52. Results.gov, Home Page, http://www.whitehouse.gov/results (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008). The story of the development of the scorecard system 
promoting privatization may be found in OMB, COMPETITIVE SOURCING, supra 
note 15, at 1. 
 53. See Executive Branch Management Scorecard: 2001 Baseline Evalua-
tion, http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/original_scorecard.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2008); see also OMB, COMPETITIVE SOURCING, supra note 15, 
at 7–8 (describing modifications of the scorecard criteria). 
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an agency is ‘green’ or ‘yellow’ if it meets all of the standards 
for success listed in the respective column, and ‘red’ if it has 
any one of a number of serious flaws listed in the ‘red’ col-
umn.”54  
The current scorecard includes green, yellow, or red rank-
ings for performance on Strategic Management of Human Capi-
tal, Competitive Sourcing (i.e., privatization), Improved Finan-
cial Performance, Expanded Electronic Government, 
Performance Improvement, Eliminating Improper Payments, 
Faith-Based and Community Initiative, Federal Real Property 
Asset Management, Improved Credit Program Management, 
and Improved Credit Program Management.55 While it might 
seem that some of these categories have nothing to do with pri-
vatization, some of the historical iterations included privatiza-
tion within the rubrics under these categories, and there are 
other ways in which they are integrated to promote the score-
card goals. For example, the rankings under “Strategic Man-
agement of Human Capital” require that those in the Senior 
Executive Service, managers, and “more than 70% of the work-
force” face personal rewards for achieving agency goals.56 One 
of those requirements is “competitive sourcing.” In other words, 
privatization of federal work is so important that the OMB 
rates the performance of federal agencies and agency execu-
tives on privatizing as one stand-alone category and as a part of 
another category. The IRS, in conjunction with the President’s 
Management Agenda, as part of Department of the Treasury, 
was required to meet privatization goals. 
Again, most of the public is unaware of this process, but 
federal agencies know all too well what they must do. To 
achieve a green on Competitive Sourcing (privatizing) an agen-
cy must formulate an OMB-approved plan to compete commer-
cial activities; execute a sufficient number of prompt competi-
tions; encourage private- and public-sector participation; and 
 
 54. Results.gov, The President’s Management Agenda: The Scorecard, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/scorecard.html (last visited Apr. 18, 
2008). 
 55. Scorecard Standards for Success, http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/ 
agenda/scorecard.html (follow “scorecard standards for success” hyperlink) 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (setting forth the standards for success under the 
President’s Management Agenda). 
 56. Id. 
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regularly track and review its competitions.57 Agencies receive 
a red ranking if they fail on one or more of these criteria.58 
At first blush, this system seems silly, but it has been quite 
effective in motivating agencies to strive for green ratings. For 
example, in July 2005, the U.S. Department of Labor bragged, 
with no irony, that it was the first federal agency to get greens 
in the five then-existing categories and to be the agency in the 
forefront of contracting out jobs.59 Labor Secretary Elaine Chao 
characterized this as “a tremendous achievement,” and stated 
that she has “high expectations that [the Department of Labor] 
will continue to meet [the standards].”60  
The IRS, along with all other parts of the federal govern-
ment, felt the same pressures.  
B. HOW THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA DROVE THE 
IRS TO CONTRACT OUT THE MAILROOM WORK 
From December 2002 through December 2003, the De-
partment of the Treasury was in deep trouble. Results.gov gave 
it reds on all standards.61 That changed in March 2004 when 
the Treasury Department received a yellow for competitive 
sourcing, or privatization.62 The General Accounting Office con-
cluded: “The IRS made steady progress on the President’s 
Management Agenda this year and we still have room for im-
provement. The IRS adjusted its ‘Getting to green plans’ to re-
flect the new ‘Proud to be’ criteria and refined its milestones to 
achieve these goals by July 2004.”63 The Treasury Department 
was successful because it had appointed a competitive sourcing 
director and “[c]ompleted contract negotiations with [the] Na-
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Rel. No. 05-1374-NAT, Labor De-
partment First to Score “All Green” on President’s Management Agenda (July 
21, 2005), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/ 
OPA20051374.htm (“As of June 30, DOL was upgraded to ‘green’ in the fifth 
government-wide [President’s Management Agenda] component, Competitive 
Sourcing.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Results.gov, supra note 54 (follow “THE SCORECARD” hyperlinks 
for Dec. 31, 2002, Mar. 31, 2003, June 30, 2003, Sept. 30, 2003, and Dec. 31, 
2003) (showing color scores for federal departments in five results categories). 
 62. Executive Branch Management Scorecard (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/20040514scorecard.pdf. 
 63. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-126, FINANCIAL AUDIT: IRS’S 
FISCAL YEARS 2003 AND 2002 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 82 (2003).  
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tional Industries for Severely Handicapped (NISH) for [the] 
IRS Mailroom,” for seventy full-time equivalent jobs.64  
A private contractor hired by the IRS to give advice on pri-
vatizing assisted the IRS in achieving this recognition. In other 
words, the President’s Management Agenda created a new 
class of private contractors to advise agencies on privatizing. 
These contractors must also be paid from an agency’s budget. 
One contractor that assisted in the mailroom privatization was 
Abacus Technology, which used the mailroom privatization to 
publicize its services.65  
The Abacus Technology website describes the company’s 
recognition for assisting the IRS with the “competitive sourcing 
effort,” and describes the 2004 Presidential Quality Award for 
Excellence it received.66  
This statement, publicizing the awards Abacus and the 
IRS received for privatizing the mailroom, reveals a culture 
that supports and promotes privatization. It is a culture of 
awards, award ceremonies, and photos of presentations in 
agency and contractor publications. Participants in the privati-
zation process give awards to one another and then use ac-
knowledgement of these awards to self-promote.  
A second entity that supported the mailroom privatization 
was NISH, whose role in securing this contract for Service-
Source and relation to JWOD is discussed below.67 A third pro-
ponent of privatizing the IRS mailroom was Sharon McPher-
son, an IRS employee. Abacus, NISH, ServiceSource, JWOD, 
and McPherson have been party to many awards as recipients 
and awardees for the mailroom privatization. Indeed, the num-
ber of awards seems out of proportion with the number of jobs 
involved, yet they seem to play a key role in the process.  
 
 64. Id. at 83.  
 65. See Abacus Technology Corporation, Competitive Sourcing and Priva-
tization, http://www.abacustech.com/Solutions/Sourcing/index.html (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008) (“In recognition of our outstanding A-76 consulting part-
nership with the IRS, we earned the Large Business Partner of the Year 
Award. Due in part to our contribution to the IRS in developing the 
PWS/QASP for the Area Distribution Center (ADC) competitive sourcing ef-
fort, the IRS was awarded the 2004 Presidential Quality Award for Excellence. 
Abacus will soon be recognized in a ceremony with the IRS Commissioner.”). 
 66. See Abacus Technology Awards, http://www.abacustech.com/about_ 
atc/awards.html (follow “2003 IRS: Nominated for Large Business Partner of 
The Year” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 67. See infra text accompanying notes 145–50.  
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McPherson was honored with the 2006 JWOD Outstanding 
Contributions Award for developing and awarding “an unprec-
edented off-site IRS mailroom contract to a JWOD-affiliated 
nonprofit agency—the first nonprofit-owned and nonprofit-
operated mailroom operation in the Federal government.”68 
ServiceSource gave awards to those who assisted in securing 
this work,69 and other nonprofit organizations and federal gov-
ernment agencies reciprocated by giving ServiceSource awards 
in turn.70 The ServiceSource magazine and website also spot-
light this small contract involving the jobs of fewer than eighty 
IRS workers.71 In September 2003, OMB honored the mailroom 
privatization as an example “of Commercial Activities included 
in Competition Plan.”72 
The Results.gov pressure may explain why the IRS was in 
such haste to privatize some parts of its work. Indeed, the pri-
vatization was so poorly executed that it must have been done 
in haste. The IRS announced the decision on April 15, 2003, 
even though the terms were not agreed to until October 31, 
2003.73 In addition, ServiceSource was incapable of managing 
the nationwide system of IRS mailrooms until December 10, 
2004,74 twenty months after its relationship with the IRS was 
 
 68. JWOD, 2006 JWOD Outstanding Contributions Award Recipients, 
http://www.jwod.gov/JWOD/about_us/Halloffame/outstanding_2006.htm (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2008) (recognizing Sharon McPherson, Contracting Officer, 
Office of Business Operations, Internal Revenue Service). 
 69. ServiceSource Recognizes Monumental Achievers and Community 
Partners at Annual Meeting, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, 
Alexandria, Va.), Winter 2007, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework 
.org/files/SS_winter07.pdf. 
 70. ServiceSource Selected to Serve as NISH Mail Center Operations Cen-
ter of Excellence, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria, 
Va.), Summer 2006, at 3, available at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/ 
ServiceSourceSummer06.pdf. 
 71. Central Mail Services Facility Opening, OUR PEOPLE WORK (Service-
Source Network, Alexandria, Va.), Fall 2004, at 3, available at http://www 
.ourpeoplework.org/files/ServcesourceFall04.pdf. 
 72. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
COMPETITIVE SOURCING: REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC-PRIVATE COM-
PETITION 12 (Supp. 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/ 
comp_sourc_addendum.pdf [hereinafter OMB, PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION]. 
 73. See Solicitation, Offer and Award, supra note 48, at 1 (showing a con-
tract issue date of April 15, 2003 and a signing date of October 31, 2003). 
 74. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. IRS (Treasury Employees II ), 
No. 04-CV-0820, 2006 WL 416161, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006) (mem.) (“[T]he 
last IRS mailroom employees lost their jobs on December 10, 2004.”). At the 
time ServiceSource won this contract, it had only operated in the larger Dis-
trict of Columbia metropolitan area, and the ServiceSource network affiliates 
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announced. Administration pressures to privatize may also ex-
plain why it was worth it to the IRS to refuse to comply with 
the law that required it to hold a competition to determine 
whether the IRS mailroom employees could do the work better 
and at lower cost than the ServiceSource “consumers”75 (the 
ServiceSource term for those people with disabilities it provides 
with employment).76 As an agency concerned with generating 
the country’s revenue, the IRS might have been especially con-
cerned with not wasting money by paying more for services. 
However, required competition and decreased costs appear to 
have played no part in the decision to privatize. A competition 
would have further slowed the privatization process, perhaps 
even derailed it if privatization cost more, and meant that the 
Treasury Department would have continued to receive a Re-
sults.gov rating of all red.  
C. THE BATTLE OVER THE DECISION TO CONTRACT OUT THE 
MAILROOM WORK 
Although failing to comply with the legal requirement to 
hold a competition meant that the Treasury Department did 
not incur the costs associated with putting work out to bid and 
assessing bids, the decision was not cost-free. The IRS faced lit-
 
operated mainly along the East Coast. See Welcome to the ServiceSource Net-
work, http://www.ourpeoplework.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
Of the employees still working in the IRS mailroom at this time, about 
thirty-five percent were people with disabilities. In re Dep’t of the Treasury 
Internal Revenue Serv. and Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (Treasury Em-
ployees I ), No. 04 FSIP 35 (July 21, 2004), Fed. Serv. Imp. Pan. Rel. No. 470, 
at 1 n.1 (Aug. 14, 2004), available at 2004 WL 1656548. When the IRS an-
nounced its intention to contract out the work on April 15, 2003, there were 
seventy-eight mailroom employees. Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities Responding to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 
6, Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161 (No. 04-CV-0820), 2004 WL 
3628200. 
 75. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, Div. 
F, tit. VI, § 647(a), 118 Stat. 3, 361; Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161, 
at *1, *6–7; see also NTEU Fights Privatization of IRS Mailrooms, FED. DAILY, 
Feb. 27, 2006, http://federaldaily.com/federaldaily/archive/2006/02/FD022706 
.htm#27c (relaying a federal court’s determination that “the IRS violated the 
law by using appropriated funds to privatize IRS mailroom work without al-
lowing IRS employees to compete”). Apparently, ServiceSource uses far more 
employees and full-time equivalent jobs to perform this work. See infra text 
accompanying note 150.  
 76. SERVICESOURCE, GUIDE TO REHABILITATION & EMPLOYMENT SERVIC-
ES 4 (2007), http://servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/files/ 
ServiceSourceRehabGuide07.pdf. 
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igation brought by former mailroom employees.77 The mailroom 
employees were represented by the NTEU, a union that has 
been vigilant in taking action against the privatization of the 
jobs of those it represents,78 both in court and in the court of 
public opinion. The NTEU’s description of itself emphasizes its 
activism as an invitation to workers to join and as a warning to 
the agencies that employ its members and potential members.79 
The NTEU represents employees in a wide range of agen-
cies and departments.80 All of them live under the threat of pri-
vatization. To protect those it represents, the NTEU must—and 
does—take an aggressive stand against privatization. In the 
case of the IRS, the NTEU has established a website with re-
sources for members to join the fight, including press releases, 
information, flyers, and action alerts, as well as offering assis-
tance to taxpayers.81  
Thus, the IRS found itself engaged in an expensive lawsuit 
to defend its decision to contract out its mailrooms. The IRS 
lost the lawsuit but won the war. By the time the court ruled 
that the IRS had broken the law, the mailroom workers were so 
dispersed and dispirited that reinstatement was not an option. 
Rather than battle on through the court of appeals, the union 
settled for $4100 to be paid to each of those few employees still 
on the payroll (defined as involuntarily separated), and $45,000 
to the NTEU Legal Representation Fund for attorney’s fees.82 
Most employees received nothing because they took early re-
 
 77. See Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161. The NTEU filed its law-
suit against the IRS on May 20, 2004, asserting that the “agency’s conversion 
of the mailroom functions to ServiceSource without a public-private job compe-
tition violated the ban on ‘direct conversions’ of federal jobs.” LaBrecque, su-
pra note 30. The case was later settled. Settlement Agreement at 1, Treasury 
Employees II, 2006 WL 416161 (No. 04-CV-0820) (on file with author). 
 78. See The National Treasury Employees Union, NTEU Overview, 
http://www.nteu.org/NTEU (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 79. See id. (“NTEU is widely known as a smart, tough organization, well-
respected for its knowledge of federal employee issues. And for its determina-
tion to work with federal agencies, with Congress, and in the courts to protect, 
promote and expand the rights of those it represents.”). 
 80. Id. (listing agencies, including the departments of Commerce, Agricul-
ture and Homeland Security, represented by the NTEU). 
 81. nteuIRSwatch.org, Home Page, http://www.nteuirswatch.org (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 82. Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, at 3; Stephen Barr, IRS to Pay 
Former Workers Whose Jobs Were Outsourced, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2006, at 
D4. 
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tirement or other options rather than risk losing their jobs and 
income.83 
D. THE COSTS TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR 
EMPLOYEES OF CONTRACTING OUT WORK 
The events and developments discussed in the prior Sec-
tions entail costs. This Section discusses the costs related to the 
President’s Management Agenda, the costs of contractor mis-
feasance and malfeasance, and the costs of errors related to 
contracting. Federal employees who retain their jobs by demon-
strating that they can do the work for less may win only at 
great cost to themselves. 
1. The Costs of Complying with the President’s Management 
Agenda  
As mentioned earlier, privatization is popularly regarded 
as a way to lower the cost of government and improve quality 
by using the private sector and market competition. However, 
privatization processes are not always structured to ensure 
that this is the case, and sometimes no effort is made to take 
these factors into account. At times private contractors have 
been allowed to compete by paying workers less and not offer-
ing health insurance. While this may achieve a lower price for 
the contract, it may merely shift costs elsewhere, for example, 
to welfare, and it does nothing to provide better service. At oth-
er times, the government prohibited competition based on lower 
pay and benefits.84 In some years, competitions had to take 
place after allowing the targeted federal employees to reorgan-
ize to achieve maximum efficiency, becoming what is called the 
“most efficient organization” or MEO.85 The theory was that the 
 
 83. It is impossible to trace these dismissed workers or to identify those 
who became charges of the state or federal government, but it is likely this 
was the fate of at least some. The Privacy Act bars access to such personal in-
formation. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). 
 84. A provision signed into law in 2005, for example, is intended to ensure 
that, in public-private competitions, the private-sector offeror does not gain an 
advantage over the in-house bid by offering inferior health insurance plans or 
requiring contract employees to pay a higher percentage for their health in-
surance than federal employees. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-287, § 8014(a)(3), 118 Stat. 951, 972; Melanie I. Dooley, 
Members of Congress Express Opposition to Health Insurance Comparability 
Repeal, 43 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2095, at 155 (Feb. 15, 2005). 
 85. OMB guidelines require a savings of “at least $10 million or 10 per-
cent of the personnel costs of the in-house performance (whichever is less).” 
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 3. 
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winner under a MEO would bring an improvement in quality, 
as well as in cost. At other times “streamlined” competitions 
have been allowed.86 Streamlined competitions allow a competi-
tion, but without permitting federal reorganization to achieve 
maximum efficiency. 
By itself and through constant revamping, the federal Cir-
cular A-76 process has created a complex infrastructure, which 
has become the foundation for the Federal Activities Inventory 
Reform Act (FAIR Act).87 The FAIR Act requires executive 
agencies to identify an inventory of work that is not inherently 
governmental, and thus subject to privatization.88 The OMB 
website provides the most tangible way to grasp what this 
process means. The OMB website contains the construction of 
Federal Register Notices of the work contractors can bid on and 
lists of agency websites “from which interested parties may 
access agency inventories.”89 
Complying with these complex processes costs money. The 
OMB webpage alone represents thousands of hours of work in 
the links to competitive sourcing and documentation require-
ments, circulars related to contracting work out, agency rank-
ings, documents, and guidelines, all of which must be included 
in the costs of privatization. This cost is unavoidable if privati-
zation is to take place—there must be some way to administer 
the decisions to privatize. Although it is obvious that this infra-
structure is a necessary part of the process, these costs are 
never included in the cost of privatization. These documents 
 
 86. See House, Senate Clear $416 Billion for DOD; Bill Includes Competi-
tive Sourcing Curbs, 42 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2069, at 723, 724 
(Aug. 3, 2004); New OFPP Study Shows Smaller Number of Federal Job Com-
petitions in FY 2004, 43 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2094, at 129 (Feb. 8, 
2005). Other changes involved cost reimbursements. See Senators Tell OMB 
Proposed Changes to FAR Would Favor Contractors over Feds, 42 Gov’t Empl. 
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2069, at 726 (Aug. 3, 2004). 
 87. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 
112 Stat. 2382 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2000 & Supp. IV 
2006)); see New OFPP Study Shows Smaller Number of Federal Job Competi-
tions in FY 2004, supra note 86, at 129. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-04-367, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: GREATER EMPHASIS NEEDED 
ON INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (2004) (reviewing 
agencies’ progress towards establishing competitive sourcing infrastructures). 
 88. 31 U.S.C. § 501. 
 89. See Office of Management & Budget, 2005 FAIR Act Inventory Re-
leases, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/fair/fair_releases_ 
index2005.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008); Office of Management & Budget, 
FAIR Notices of Availability, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/ 
fair/notices_avail.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).  
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and processes are the fruit of the expenditure of taxpayer mon-
ey, and that expenditure must be included in any calculation of 
the costs of privatization.  
The opportunity cost to each agency is also ignored. Con-
sider the IRS. It was created to collect the taxes the govern-
ment needs to operate. Time taken to comply with require-
ments for competitive sourcing is time lost from the agency’s 
mission. Each agency must spend time and money engaging in 
the competition and/or MEO process and finding work that 
must be offered for competition. The decision to privatize in-
volves, among other steps, case analyses, pre-decisional docu-
ments, monthly coordination meetings, and union communica-
tion.90  
In short, the process of preparing agency “inventory” for 
privatization is not trivial, and the costs can be so great that 
they affect the operation of core agency functions. 
2. The Costs of Contractor Misfeasance and Malfeasance 
Privatization does not always operate optimally. At times, 
there are serious problems of contractor nonperformance and, 
at times, contractor malfeasance. For example, during the long 
struggle over privatizing IRS debt collection,91 a pilot experi-
ment led to theft of tax payments by the private debt collectors, 
some of whom were eventually convicted. In 2007, Mellon Bank 
“agreed to pay an additional $16.5 million to settle claims re-
lated to the 2001 destruction of tens of thousands of individual 
tax returns and checks that the bank was supposed to process 
as an agent for the Treasury Department.”92 This settlement 
was in addition to $18 million already paid to reimburse the 
federal government for the value of the interest lost on the de-
 
 90. OMB, PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION, supra note 72, at 3. 
 91. See IRS Private Debt Collection Program: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 5–25 (2007) (written statement of 
Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-utl/ntatestimony_wm_pdc_052307.pdf [hereinafter Olson State-
ment] (describing many concerns with the efficiency and security of private 
debt collection programs); TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 
2006-10-078, THE REVISED PRIVATE DEBT COLLECTION REQUEST FOR QUOTA-
TION ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED PRIOR DEFICIENCIES IN THE SOLICITATION ME-
THODOLOGY (2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/ 
2006reports/200610078fr.pdf. 
 92. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Mellon Bank 
Agrees to Pay Additional $16.5 Million for the Destruction of Tax Returns and 
Checks (June 29, 2007), http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/oi_highlights_2007.shtml 
[hereinafter Mellon Bank Agrees to Pay]. 
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stroyed checks and the costs incurred by the federal govern-
ment in obtaining replacement checks from the affected tax-
payers.93 Mellon also violated the False Claims Act94 and its 
employees destroyed more than seventy thousand taxpayer re-
mittances worth more than $ 1.2 billion.95  
A more recent pilot program also had problems. In a 2006 
report, the National Taxpayer Advocate found that private debt 
collectors were not adequately trained to do their work.96 As a 
result, it took sixty-five IRS employees to monitor the work of 
seventy-five private tax collectors.97 In her written testimony 
before the Ways and Means Committee, Nina Olson said pri-
vate debt collection “may be costing the government more than 
it receives.”98 Olson also raised concerns about a wide range of 
problems connected with the private debt collectors.99 
Perhaps these individuals who broke the law would have 
done so regardless of whether privatization existed. However, 
we do know that privatization gave the private debt collectors 
access and opportunity to take actions that have been costly in 
terms of their effect on taxpayers’ lives and time and in prose-
cution of these crimes.  
3. The Costs of Errors in Contracting 
Mathematical errors have led to privatization, even when a 
private contractor costs more than having public employees 
perform the work.100 In one case, the error was the fault of the 
private contractor hired to analyze other contractor bids for the 
OMB.101 This error was difficult to correct, because at the time 
only a wrongly out-bid private contractor was allowed to chal-
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000). 
 95. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-299, IRS LOCKBOX BANKS: 
MORE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT, STRONGER CONTROLS, AND FURTHER STUDY OF 
COSTS AND BENEFITS ARE NEEDED 2 (2003). 
 96. See THE NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at I-2 (2006), available at http://www.irs 
.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc-exec_summary-2006.pdf.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Olson Statement, supra note 91, at 1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See DOD IG Finds $32 Million Error Critical to Source Decision in A-
76 Competition, 41 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2004, at 370 (Apr. 8, 
2003).  
 101. Id. (describing a mistake made by Mevatec Corp., a consultant com-
pany). 
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lenge a decision,102 not the federal employees who were to lose 
their jobs.103  
Work improperly contracted out should, of course, be 
brought back in-house. However, the mailroom case shows this 
is not necessarily easy to do. As with the IRS mailroom, em-
ployees may have retired or taken other jobs or other actions 
may have been taken that make it difficult or impossible to 
take the work back in-house. As a result, the cost or impossibil-
ity of returning the work may mean that it continues to be per-
formed by a contractor at greater cost and lower quality. Fur-
thermore, when experienced employees leave, institutional 
memory may be lost, leading to a less efficient operation. Al-
though not part of the normal assessment of privatization, the 
loss of jobs, their performance at higher cost and with lower 
quality, and the loss of institutional memory leading to greater 
inefficiency are costs that need to be taken into account in as-
sessing privatization.  
4. The Costs When Federal Employees Win Their Work 
In some cases, federal workers have won competitions un-
der the MEO process by reorganizing in order to prove they can 
perform the work better and for less. However, they may find 
that they have saved their jobs at great cost to themselves. For 
example, in August 2005, low-wage IRS workers who handled 
and stored tax returns, including files supervisors, lead mail 
clerks, mail clerks, and clerks, won a competition over two pri-
vate bidders.104 Before their MEO, that work was performed by 
“843 employees, including 346 permanent employees, 360 sea-
sonal employees, 55 temporary employees, and 82 intermittent 
employees at eight service centers.”105 The price of keeping the 
work was painful. It required cutting 166 jobs and converting 
other jobs from full time to jobs with no fixed work schedule 
and no benefits.106 Here, the result of just the process of priva-
 
 102. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 3 nn.4 & 5. 
 103. Id.; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-1022T, COMPET-
ITIVE SOURCING: IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE CHALLENGING FOR FEDERAL 
AGENCIES 7–8 (2003) (describing federal employee complaints about the lack 
of an appeal process). 
 104. Louis C. LaBrecque, IRS Workers Win Battle over Outsourcing of Tax 
Return Handlings; 166 Jobs Still Cut, 43 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 
2121, at 824 (Aug. 23, 2005). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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tization has led to more low-paid employees who lack health 
benefits and may thus need public support. 
In other words, the system that compels federal agencies to 
privatize—and that led to the loss of the IRS mailroom jobs—is 
a system that has the power to turn decent jobs into bad jobs, 
with low pay, job insecurity, and no benefits. It is also one that 
imposes large costs on the public in the process. 
III.  THE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT SUPPORTS THE 
MOVEMENT OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS INTO THE 
WORLD OF PRIVATIZATION   
A. THE NONPROFIT PRIVATIZATION INDUSTRY AND THE POVERTY 
JOBS IT CREATES 
So far we have examined the privatization of one federal 
agency’s mailroom work as a way to identify and account for 
the costs of the federal privatization process. The IRS mailroom 
also provides a window into the growing presence and impact of 
nonprofit agencies as contractors. Privatizing the IRS mailroom 
contributed to the revenue of ServiceSource, the contractor who 
was given the mailroom contract. In fiscal year 2006, Service-
Source had nearly $70 million in revenues.107 As ServiceSource 
and other nonprofit organizations enter the world of privatiza-
tion, their operations must be included among the full costs of 
privatization. 
ServiceSource may be a nonprofit agency, but with annual 
revenues of $69.5 million108 it is hardly a shoe-string operation. 
Its federal contract work extends far beyond IRS mailrooms. As 
of 2006, ServiceSource had contracts to perform mailroom, food 
service, and warehouse work for many different federal agen-
cies.109 All or most of this work is certain to be low-wage at 
 
 107. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2006), available 
at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/Network_ar06.pdf. 
 108. Id. 
 109. As of 2006, ServiceSource had mailroom contracts with, among others, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Commerce and 
Transportation, the National Archives I & II, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, the United States Mint, the Internal Revenue Service, Fort 
Bragg, and the National Science Foundation. See ServiceSource Network, Pub-
lications, http://www.ourpeoplework.org/content.asp?contentid=357 (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008) (follow “Annual Reports” and “Newsletters” hyperlinks). 
As of 2006, ServiceSource also provided food service for, among others, the 
Marine Corps, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Fort Bragg, the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), General Services Ad-
ministration (GSA), the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Pope Air Force Base, 
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best. Moreover, providing low-wage work at privatized job sites 
is a growth industry for ServiceSource. Revenue for fiscal year 
2006 was up 13.5% from fiscal year 2005.110 In 2006, Service-
Source employed 188 workers, or 17% of its workforce, in mail 
service,111 and operated in nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia.112 This growth in revenues enabled ServiceSource 
Network to hire a large executive staff, which, in turn, likely 
helps ServiceSource further increase revenues.  
B. THE MANY PIECES OF SERVICESOURCE 
The ServiceSource Network is formally composed of four 
affiliates: the Opportunity Center, Inc., ServiceSource, Em-
ploymentSource, and Abilities of Florida.113 ServiceSource is a 
nonprofit organization located in Alexandria, Virginia.114 These 
organizations’ formal and informal affiliations and cooperative 
relationships include overlapping officers and employees, with 
as many as six organizations contributing to an individual’s 
pay. The Network appears to be bound together by its stated 
purposes of providing work, training, and support services to 
people with disabilities.115  
However, ServiceSource has a network of related organiza-
tions that extends far beyond its formal affiliates. The number 
of organizations, the purpose of their relationships, and the 
way money moves among them is puzzling. That complexity 
makes it difficult for outsiders to know who the organization is, 
but it also seems to place an extra burden on ServiceSource. 
For example, each of these organizations must file a separate 
income tax form, and the complexity seems to have caused its 
tax preparer at least minor problems in knowing exactly how 
much its officers are paid. Each form includes tables with pay 
for other organizations, but some of these figures vary slightly. 
 
the VA Medical Center, and the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA). See id. 
ServiceSource also performed warehouse work at the Departments of Agricul-
ture, Commerce, and Transportation. See id. 
 110. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, supra note 107, at 9. 
 111. Id. at 2.  
 112. ServiceSource Network Achieves Unprecedented Year in FY 06, OUR 
PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria, Va.), Summer 2006, at 3, 
available at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/Servcesource/Summer06.pdf. 
 113. ServiceSource Network, About Us, http://www.ourpeoplework.org/ 
content.asp?contentid=354 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 114. Id. 
 115. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, supra note 107, at 2. 
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It is unclear how this complexity promotes ServiceSource’s 
stated mission and whether the costs of complexity outweigh 
the benefits to those ServiceSource is supposed to serve. The 
law gives nonprofit organizations certain benefits in exchange 
for strict limitations on their purposes and behavior that would 
not apply to a private company.116 Although there is no evi-
dence of any illegality on the part of ServiceSource, such a 
complex organizational and pay structure could facilitate the 
evasion of laws that limit certain behavior by nonprofit organi-
zations, such as prohibitions on lobbying.117 In exchange for be-
ing tax-free, the tax forms of nonprofit organizations are public, 
and they must reveal meaningful information that can be used 
to determine whether they are in compliance with the law. A 
complex organizational structure, for example, would permit 
one component to state on its Form 990118 that it engaged in no 
lobbying while gaining lobbying services through a sister or-
ganization.  
ServiceSource’s operations appear to straddle both the 
nonprofit world and the world of small business. Its subsidiary 
division, Precision Images, provides various copying and other 
document services and employs fifteen people with disabili-
ties.119 Its operating costs are lowered in several ways. First, 
section 214(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act permits paying a 
sub-minimum wage to “individuals . . . whose earning or pro-
ductive capacity is impaired by . . . physical or mental deficien-
 
 116. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000) (exempting organizations described in 
I.R.C. § 501(c) from taxation); id. § 501(c) (limiting tax-exempt status to not-
for-profit entities organized and operated “exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to fos-
ter national or international amateur sports competition . . . , or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals”).  
 117. See id. § 501(c) (prohibiting tax-exempt organizations from lobbying or 
participating in political campaigns for public offices). 
 118. See I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax, Pt. IV (asking whether the organization engaged in political lobbying dur-
ing the previous year). Tax-exempt organizations use Form 990 to provide the 
IRS with information necessary to maintain their tax-exempt status. See In-
ternal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, at 1 
(2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990-ez.pdf (discussing the 
purpose of the form). 
 119. Press Release, ServiceSource, ServiceSource, Inc. Precision Images 
Division and Fairfax Imaging Selected to Receive Assistive Technology Award 
at 2006 NISH National Conference (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http:// 
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/files/PrecisionImages.pdf; see also 
Meeting Minutes, Mid-Atlantic District, The Association for Work Process Im-
provement (Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://www.tawpi.org/documents/ 
MidAtlanticChapterMtg10-26-06.pdf. 
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cy.”120 Second, the tax code promotes donations of goods to non-
profit organizations by giving the donor a tax deduction. Since 
2001, ServiceSource’s Precision Images has benefited from 
Fairfax Imaging’s donations of its Quick Modules Software.121 
It also benefits from the array of support services Service-
Source can offer. Indeed, a job at Precision Images is more than 
just a job—it is training. That training may be provided 
through donations and grants. While this training can be use-
ful, mixing private-sector activities with training, transporta-
tion, and other services to people with disabilities may cause 
confusion of missions, and undermine market competition. 
The operation of the ServiceSource network and its allied 
organizations may reflect the way nonprofit organizations are 
run and have little to do with contracting out as an important 
source of money and support. At least some of the complexity 
may be inherent in providing the range of services the Service-
Source Network offers to the disabled. It could be a product of a 
system that operates inefficiently. Perhaps the complexity of 
the ServiceSource system and its finances is related to its need 
to fundraise, win grants and government contracts, and per-
suade governments to facilitate such funding through legisla-
tion. Finally, some complexity may be related to and a conse-
quence of ServiceSource’s move into the business of 
privatization.  
While ServiceSource publicizes many of its affiliates, sub-
sidiaries, and related organizations, locating other related or-
ganizations and understanding their relationships requires 
more research. Subsidiaries and closely related organizations 
include organizations located at the same address as Service-
Source Network and ServiceSource and in some cases, at the 
same telephone number. These include ServiceSource Founda-
tion, the organizations’ fundraising arm;122 EmploymentSource, 
 
 120.  29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (2000). 
 121.  Precision Images Division and Fairfax Imaging Receive Assistive 
Technology Awards from NISH, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, 
Alexandria, Va.), Summer 2006, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework 
.org/files/ServcesourceSummer06.pdf. 
 122. ServiceSource Network, ServiceSource Foundation, http:// 
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=372 (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008). Although not discussed in this Article, fundraising and 
support for fundraising through devices such as awards and awards banquets 
is a major focus of the ServiceSource affiliates. These activities provide public-
ity designed to appeal to donors and other supporters. The IRS mailroom pri-
vatization was highly publicized—indeed, to a degree that seems to far exceed 
the number of jobs created. 
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which provides employment services and outsourcing options to 
private and government agencies in North and South Caroli-
na;123 the Opportunity Center, Inc. (OCI), which provides ser-
vices in Delaware; Community Thrift, Inc.;124 the Laurie Mit-
chell Employment Center, Inc.;125 and VaACCSES (the Virginia 
Association of Community Rehabilitation Programs), a lobbying 
and educational organization.126 Another formal SSN subsidi-
ary, Abilities, Inc. of Florida, also lists many subsidiary corpo-
rations on its IRS 990.127 These subsidiary corporations are 
funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
to help individuals with disabilities find rental properties.128  
Most of ServiceSource’s $70 million in revenues is generat-
ed from public sources. Table 1, infra, shows that organizations 
related to ServiceSource derived between 98.17% and 100% of 





 123. ServiceSource Network, Welcome to EmploymentSource, http:// 
servicesrcsub2.timberlakepublishing.com (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 124. Community Thrift, Inc. operates thrift stores that provide work oppor-
tunities in Manassas, Virginia and Fayetteville, North Carolina. Employ-
mentSource, Community Thrift of Fayetteville, http://servicesrcsub2 
.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=368 (last visited Apr. 18, 
2008); ServiceSource Network, Community Thrift of Manassas, http:// 
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=373 (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 125. The Laurie Mitchell Employment Center website lists the Service-
Source main address under its contact information. Compare Laurie Mitchell 
Employment Center, A Brief Intro, http://www.lmec.org/Home.asp (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2008) (listing its address as 6295 Edsall Road, Suite 175, Alexandria, 
Virginia 22312), with ServiceSource Network, Contact Us, http:// 
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=389 (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008) (listing its address as 6295 Edsall Road, Suite 175, Alex-
andria, Virginia 22312). 
 126. See VaACCSES, Vision Statement/Mission Statement, http://www 
.vaaccses.org/html/about.htm (follow “Vision Statement/Mission Statement” 
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (describing its activities as “develop[ing] 
effective relationships and influenc[ing] policy makers, funders and advocates 
through information, advocacy, education and training”); see also VaACCSES, 
Statement of Program Service Accomplishments (I.R.S. Form 990, Pt. III) 
(2005) (listing its primary exempt purpose as “educational”). VaACCSES 
claimed on its 2005 IRS filing that it spent $10,207 on lobbying. VaACCSES, 
Statements About Activities (I.R.S. Form 990, Schedule A, pt. III, l. 1) (2005).  
 127. These subsidiaries include a number of separately incorporated organ-
izations, including Homes for Independence, Inc. See Abilities, Inc. of Florida, 
Additional Information, pt. IV, l. 80 (I.R.S. Form 990, Statement 1) (2005). 
 128. Id. 
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Table 1. Public Support of ServiceSource-Related Organizations129 
Organization Percentage of Revenues from 
Public Support 
Opportunity Center, Inc. 99.6989% 
Abilities, Inc. of Florida n/a 
ServiceSource Employment Services, Inc. 99.973% 
EmploymentSource 99.8935% 
Homes for Independence, Inc. n/a 
ServiceSource 98.1737% 
ServiceSource Foundation 100% 
Abilities Rehabilitation Center Foundation n/a 
Community Thrift, Inc. 99.999% 
Yesterday’s Rose n/a 
VaACCSES 99.71% 
 
The organizational complexity is recapitulated in the pay 
structure for ServiceSource Network officers and key em-
ployees. The data in Table 2, infra, show that pay for virtually 
all these high-level employees came from multiple sources. Half 
of these employees received pay from six sources. This complex-
ity obviously pays off for the officers and key employees of Ser-
viceSource, but it makes tracking the level and source of pay 
difficult.  
Some may wonder whether the level of pay to the individu-
als and in total is appropriate. This answer is complicated by 
issues related to geographic location, size, and the business of 
the organization. What can be said, however, is that the high-
est pay (which includes pay, benefits, and expense accounts) 
was $263,474 for the CEO, paid through six organizations. For 
fiscal year 2005, eight of the sixteen individuals listed in Table 










 129. The data in Table 1 are derived from each organization’s I.R.S. Form 
990 for 2005. 
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Table 2. Pay Structure for ServiceSource Network Officers and  
Key Employees130 
Officers and  
Key Employees 









Janet Samuelson $263,474 42 SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes, 
SSES 
Mark Hall $206,552 40 SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes, 
SSES 
David Hodge $202,541 37 SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes, 
SSES 
Bruce Patterson $186,765 40 SS, OCI 
Bertha Ngenge $167,575 41 SS, ES, OCI, Abili-
ties, Homes, SSES 
William Sandonato $205,415 40+ SS, ES, OCI, Abili-
ties, Homes, SSES 
Jeff Ring $114,648 35 SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes, 
SSES 
Lisa Ward $114,895 48 SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes, 
SSES 
Thomas Chang $156,819 42 SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes, 
SSES 
Catherine Lloyd $121,525 40 OCI 
Guy Klenke $179,353 40 SS, ES, Abilities, Homes, 
SSES 
Alan Desrosier $85,529 40 SSES 
Larry Crabtree  $144,985 40 SS 
Thomas Troeschel $143,581 40 SS 
James Aynes $90,332 40 ES 
Lori Kreisle $68,680 unknown Homes 
SS=ServiceSource; ES=EmploymentSource; OCI=Opportunity Center, Inc.; Abilities=Abilities 
Inc. of Florida; Homes=Homes for Independence, Inc.; SSES=ServiceSource Employment Ser-
vices, Inc. 
 
 130. The figures are taken from the organizations’ 2005 I.R.S. Form 990 for 
key officers. The Form 990 information does not necessarily disclose all remu-
neration for these individuals. 
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In addition to the officers listed on this table, a number of 
executive individuals also receive pay through the same organ-
izations listed in Table 2. For example, lobbyist Karen Tefelski 
was paid $94,178 in 2005 as an associate director of Service-
Source,131 as well as $83,475 as executive director of 
VaACCSES,132 for a total of $177,653.133  
The IRS 990 and other publicly available documents do not 
explain why ServiceSource uses this complex structure nor 
whether it is a reasonable way to operate. Only research based 
on the more detailed accounts of each organization and other 
internal documents can determine whether this form of opera-
tion is an appropriate use of what in large part is funding de-
rived from public sources. 
C. THE PRICE OF PRIVATIZATION AND LOW-WAGE WORK  
While the officers and key employees do not receive outra-
geously high pay by today’s private-sector standards, they do 
receive far greater compensation than many of those who work 
for the ServiceSource Network-related organizations. Those 
employees with disabilities, in particular, are certainly among 
the low paid. 
Table 3, infra, compares employee and officer pay. The col-
umn “Average Pay per Employee” assumes that Officer Pay is 
not included in Total Employee Pay. If that assumption is in-
 
 131. See ServiceSource, Inc., Compensation of the Five Highest Paid Em-
ployees Other Than Officers, Directors, and Trustees (I.R.S. Form 990, Sche-
dule A, pt. I) (2006) (listing Karen Tefelski as Association Director, compen-
sated at $94,178).  
 132. See VaACCSES, List of Current Officers, Directors, Trustees, and Key 
Employees (I.R.S. Form 990, pt. V-A) (2006) (listing Karen Tefelski as Execu-
tive Director, compensated at $83,475). 
 133. Tefelski is also listed as a registered lobbyist on behalf of VaACCSES. 
See Virginia Association of Community Rehabilitation Programs, Donors: De-
tails of Lobbying Relationship, http://vpap.org/donors/lobby_details.cfm?key= 
ORP000210590&inkey=INP000302912 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). The rela-
tionship between ServiceSource and VaACCSES apparently predated Tefels-
ki’s hire. On its 2005 Form 990, VaACCSES lists the Executive Director as 
simply “Service Source,” compensated at $93,229. ServiceSource, Inc., List of 
Current Officers, Directors, Trustees, and Key Employees (I.R.S. Form 990, pt. 
V) (2005). When asked whether any “officers, directors, trustees or key em-
ployees . . . or highest compensated employees . . . or highest compensated pro-
fessional and other independent contractors . . . receive compensation from 
any other organizations, whether tax exempt or taxable, that are related to 
this organization through common supervision or common control,” however, 
VaACCSES answered “no.” VaACCSES, Current Officers, Directors, Trustees 
and Key Employees (I.R.S. Form 990, Part V-A, Line 75(c)) (2006). 
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correct, then average pay would be lower. For example, in the 
case of OCI, average pay would drop by about $2000 to $9795. 
Another way to assess pay levels is to consider total officer pay 
compared to the total employee pay. In some cases, officer pay 
exceeds total employee pay (Abilities Rehabilitation Center 
Foundation), while in others there is either no officer pay 
(Community Thrift and Yesterday’s Rose) or it comprises only 
five percent of total employee pay (ServiceSource). 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Employee and Officer Pay134 






OCI 165 $1,958,012 $11,866.73 $341,786 
Abilities 150 $3,720,288 $24,801.92 $303,335 
SSES 219 $3,577,694 $16,336.50 $197,309 
Employment 
Source 
278 $3,087,293 $11,105.37 $278,249 
Homes 5 $53,387 $10,677.40 $99,396 
ServiceSource 999 $19,730,930 $19,750.68 $1,053,676 





3 $58,845 $19,615.00 $124,235 
Community 
Thrift 
10 $158,076 $15,807.60 0.00 
Yesterday’s 
Rose 
12 $163,042 $13,586.83 0.00 
 
The average pay per employee does not reveal the range of 
pay nor what jobs the pay is for. In order for ServiceSource to 
provide services for its constituents, it must employ people with 
a wide range of skills. To attract those skilled workers it will 
 
 134. As with the officer pay, the information on pay and number of em-
ployees in Table 3 is derived from information reported on the organizations’ 
tax returns for 2005, the most recent forms available. 
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have to pay more than the average pay displayed in Table 3. 
Recent job postings for the DC Metro Region illustrate the 
range of jobs ServiceSource hires for: Resource Room Instruc-
tor, Assistant Manager I & II, Facilities Engineer, Employment 
Development Specialist, Compensation & Benefits Manager, IT 
Network Administrator, Community Integration Specialist I, 
Community Rehabilitation Specialist I, and Van Drivers.135  
In the same announcement were job listings for “Set-Aside 
Positions,” or positions open only to individuals with a docu-
mented disability.136 Those positions include Dining Facility 
Attendants and Mess Attendants at the FBI Academy in Quan-
tico, Virginia.137 The mess attendant salary is posted as 
“[a]round $9.01 per hour.”138 For a full-time job, that would be 
an annual salary of about $18,000. However, as the next Sec-
tion shows, in the case of the IRS mailroom work, many of the 
workers did not have full-time jobs.  
In short, working for ServiceSource can pay, but of Servi-
ceSource’s $70 million in revenues, almost all paid for by the 
taxpayers, very little seems to provide self-supporting, well-
paying jobs for those ServiceSource exists to serve. If that is 
correct, it is a high price to pay for low-wage work. This is, of 
course, a preliminary judgment made on the basis only of pub-
licly available documents. An examination of other materials 
might lead to a different conclusion. However, if it is correct 
that this money creates low-wage work of such poor quality 
that those employed cannot be self-supporting, then we need to 
ask whether this is this the best way to promote the interests of 
people with disabilities. Moreover, if these funds are used to 
destroy and degrade existing jobs that did allow the workers to 
be self-supporting, then this does not seem to be an appropriate 
course of action or use of public money. 
IV.  THE NONPROFIT CONTRACTOR THAT WAS GIVEN 
THE IRS MAILROOM WORK   
A network of nonprofit organizations that provides services 
to people with disabilities, with $70 million in annual revenues, 
should be counted as a success. However, the elements of Ser-
 
 135. ServiceSource Network, DC Metro Region, http://www.ourpeoplework 
.org/content.asp?contentid=383 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
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viceSource’s success are not simply hard work and quality of 
service. In addition, its achievements include costs. 
A. AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS 
ServiceSource describes itself as a small nonprofit organi-
zation that employs about one thousand people with disabilities 
and specializes in “government contracts to operate mail cen-
ters, provide food services to our Nation’s military and adminis-
trative services.”139 Of those one thousand people, Service-
Source employs “approximately 100 people with disabilities . . . 
[to work] at more than 30 IRS mailrooms across the country.”140 
ServiceSource has certainly been successful in getting contracts 
to perform this work. Champions of privatization, however, 
usually promise higher quality work at lower cost. If a contrac-
tor does not meet both of these criteria, then the public is 
spending more money than it should. How successful has Ser-
viceSource been in meeting these criteria? ServiceSource 
needed eighteen months to reach the point where it could man-
age work done by fewer than eighty IRS employees. This time 
lag suggests that no money was saved during that period. De-
spite this, ServiceSource continued to successfully acquire con-
tracts to operate other federal mailrooms. 
In June 2007, ServiceSource attributed its success not to 
its own merits, but rather to the support provided by the 
JWOD program. “Since 1981, the AbilityOne [JWOD] program 
has played a vital role in providing ServiceSource Network em-
ployees with challenging and rewarding employment opportun-
ities.”141 In 2006, ServiceSource said that it was thanks to 
JWOD that it operated seventy mail centers for sixteen federal 
agencies and employed “over 175 people with disabilities who 
 
 139. ServiceSource Recognizes Monumental Achievers and Community 
Partners at Annual Meeting, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, 
Alexandria, Va.), Winter 2007, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework 
.org/files/ss_winter07.pdf. 
 140. Id. As of fiscal year 2006, ServiceSource Network employed eighty-
eight workers in mail service, that is, seventeen percent of its total workers 
with disabilities. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, supra note 107, at 2. 
 141. Press Release, ServiceSource Network, ServiceSource Network Em-
ployees Visit Capitol Hill (June 11, 2007), available at http://servicesrcsub1 
.timberlakepublishing.com/files/NISH_Grassroots07.pdf. As of 2006, Service-
Source workers were employed in government mailrooms at the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency’s Research and Distribution Departments and at its Da-
ta Acquisition and Handling System (DAHS Mail Center), and the 
Department of Transportation. SERVICESOURCE, supra note 76, at 15.  
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process over 75 million pieces of mail per year for the federal 
government.”142  
As discussed earlier, the JWOD program, now referred to 
as AbilityOne, is a part of the government, created under the 
Javits-Wagner-O’Day (JWOD) Act.143 Its purpose is to “gener-
ate employment and training opportunities for people who are 
blind or have other severe disabilities . . . [by providing] a ma-
jor and stable source of employment-generating contracts for 
over 600 nonprofit agencies.”144 Two nonprofit organizations, 
NIB and NISH, work with JWOD to distribute “government or-
ders among nonprofit agencies employing persons who are 
blind or have other severe disabilities . . . , by working closely 
with government contracting specialists and local nonprofit 
agencies to match government requirements with the capabili-
ties of the agencies.”145 NIB and NISH are independent private 
organizations, not federal entities, but they play a major role in 
awarding federal contracts. Each of the 626 community rehabil-
itation programs that participated in the JWOD Program at 
the end of fiscal year 1997 is affiliated with either NIB or 
NISH.146 
Without NISH, NIB, and the JWOD program, a small non-
profit organization operating mainly in the Virginia area and 
only on the East Coast probably could not have secured a na-
tionwide federal contract to operate something as sensitive and 
critical to the national interest as the IRS mailrooms. In addi-
tion, winning this work required support in order to find sub-
contractors outside the Washington, D.C. area.147 According to 
a NISH report on its operations in fiscal year 2004, Service-
Source directly managed only one IRS Mail Facility—a facility 
near ServiceSource’s headquarters in Virginia.148 ServiceSource 
 
 142. ServiceSource Selected to Serve as NISH Mail Center Operations Cen-
ter of Excellence, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria, 
Va.), Summer 2006, at 15, available at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/ 
ServiceSourceSummer06.pdf. 
 143. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 144. Beverly Milkman, The Javits-Wagner-O’Day Program, AM. REHABILI-
TATION, Spring 1998, at 10, 10. 
 145. Id. at 11–12. 
 146. Id. at 13. 
 147. NATIONAL INDUSTRIES FOR THE SEVERELY HANDICAPPED [NISH], 2004 
ANNUAL REPORT 2–3, 19 (2004), available at http://www.nish.org/NISH/Doc/0/ 
TP23HRVQGP6KJEG2QO4QGRIC71/AR_FINAL.pdf (describing NISH’s role 
in securing IRS mailroom contracts for NISH- and NIB-associated nonprofit 
agencies). 
 148. Id. at 19. 
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subcontracted management of the rest of the IRS’s thirty-three 
mailrooms to twenty-eight other nonprofit organizations spread 
across twenty-four states.149 These mailroom subcontracts pro-
vided ninety-one full-time equivalent jobs for people who were 
blind or had other severe disabilities. NISH also reported that 
at the end of the 2004 fiscal year, only thirteen of the thirty-
three IRS mailrooms were “operational.”150 
In other words, identifying the costs of contracting out fed-
eral work to nonprofit agencies affiliated with NISH or NIB 
means including the costs of the JWOD program and the public 
support provided to NISH and NIB. 
B. THE COSTS OF UNQUALIFIED PRIVATIZATION SUCCESS 
The 2004 NISH report implies that the work seventy-eight 
IRS mailroom employees working in sites across the country 
had performed before privatization, became ninety-one full-
time equivalent jobs following privatization. ServiceSource ap-
parently completed the labor of these ninety-one full-time 
equivalent jobs using about 197 employees with disabilities, in 
addition to other workers. At this time, ServiceSource was op-
erating only one mailroom and ServiceSource and its subcon-
tractors were only operating thirteen of the twenty-eight IRS 
mailrooms.151 This increase in full-time equivalents and work-
ers employed suggests that the real cost per job to have mail-
room work performed by contractors is greater following mail-
room privatization. In addition, using 197 people to perform 
ninety-one full-time equivalent jobs meant that the average 
worker was working about eighteen hours a week and thus un-
likely to be able to be self-supporting.  
The costs of subcontracting must also include higher costs 
of supervision. First, there are more employees to supervise. 
Second, some ServiceSource workers who perform mailroom 
work come from its “Group Supported Employment” program 
which has a supervisor to “consumer” ratio of five to eight.152 In 
addition, ServiceSource provided transportation to work sites, 
as well as counseling, program planning, community integra-
tion, and training in using public transportation.153 and seems 
likely to have provided at least some of these services to a far 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 2–3, 19. 
 152. SERVICESOURCE, supra note 76, at 12. 
 153. Id. 
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greater number of workers needed to perform the mailroom 
jobs. All this information concerning staffing and including the 
high level of public revenue ServiceSource and its related or-
ganizations received are costs that can be translated into tax-
payer dollars that ServiceSource has received as grants and 
other forms of government subsidies. 
To the costs identified so far, we must also add the impact 
of inefficient workflow created by serial outsourcing, the com-
plexity of this new organizational structure, and the problem of 
ensuring security. It is easy to dismiss the almost invisible 
work done in an organization’s mailroom as low level and un-
skilled. However, even in the day of electronic communication, 
mailroom efficiency is critical to the mission of the agency. In 
the case of the IRS, it is likely to involve the receipt of sensitive 
taxpayer documents and information which must be kept se-
cure. 
Inefficient workflow problems appear to have plagued the 
post-privatization IRS mailroom. In 2006, NTEU President Col-
leen Kelly testified that “employees have witnessed abysmal 
mail service by the contractor. Mail has been misdirected to in-
correct PODs, mail is not delivered in a timely fashion, and IRS 
employees are expected to do the work for which the vendor has 
a contractual obligation.”154 Kelly contended that these failures 
deserved investigation and action: “This is certainly an area 
where the IRS should further explore the true cost to the U.S. 
taxpayer in using an outside contractor and consider returning 
the mailroom work to IRS employees.”155 
Inefficiency is not unusual when work is contracted out. 
The sorts of problems encountered during the privatization of 
the IRS mailrooms and their attendant costs are the same sorts 
of problems that regularly arise from contracting out work.156 A 
Deloitte Consulting study implies that contracting out the 
mailroom work places an obligation on the IRS to perform over-
 
 154. IRS Oversight Board Public Forum 6 (Feb. 8, 2006) (testimony of  Col-
leen M. Kelley, President, National Treasury Employees Union), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/meetings/2-08-06/statement-NTEU.pdf . 
 155. Id. 
 156. See DELOITTE CONSULTING, CALLING A CHANGE IN THE OUTSOURCING 
MARKET 2 (2005), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_ 
outsourcing_callingachange.pdf (“The world’s largest companies have engaged 
in outsourcing for a variety of reasons . . . . However, contrary to the optimistic 
portrayal of outsourcing by vendors and the marketplace, outsourcing is an 
extraordinarily complex process and the anticipated benefits often fail to ma-
terialize.”). 
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sight to ensure the contractors have not been shirking their du-
ties. That oversight must be nationwide, and it must now pene-
trate through multiple levels of contracting. That oversight, 
too, must be included in an accounting of costs. 
  CONCLUSION   
The Government Accountability Office recently released 
two reports that found contractors for the Department of Ho-
meland Security were performing work that, by law, is inhe-
rently governmental and only to be performed by federal em-
ployees.157 The increasing use of privatization—a process that 
was supposed to be concerned with more mundane issues such 
as improving performance and lowering costs—means that this 
country is engaged in a shift of government and governance. 
This transformation has gone on with little public notice paid to 
it and with no public demand that claims for improved service 
and cost savings be verified. The time is long past for engaging 
in a full and fair accounting of the costs involved in privatiza-
tion. This Article is a first step in identifying many of the 
costs that are likely to be incurred in connection with federal 
privatization and to a greater or lesser extent with privatiza-
tion at the state or local levels. Those previously ignored costs 
include the expense of a complex system set up to promote the 
process of privatization and the costs of responding to the con-
sequences of privatization, among many others. For years we 
have made no effort to find the answer to whether privatization 
results in savings or whether privatization costs outweigh its 
benefits.  
The privatization of the IRS mailroom casts light on issues 
often left unexplored because understanding them seems too 
complex and the connections among them and to us seem un-
clear. The story of how seventy-eight public employees lost 
their jobs and its aftermath provides a lens through which to 
understand the complexities of privatization and its impact on 
us. The story of the IRS mailroom privatization reveals a very 
expensive process that seems to have done no more than re-
place workers with disabilities with other workers with disabil-
 
 157.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-142T, DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY: RISK ASSESSMENT AND ENHANCED OVERSIGHT NEEDED 
TO MANAGE RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS 11 (2007); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, GAO-07-990, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: IMPROVED 
ASSESSMENT AND OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO MANAGE RISK OF CONTRACTING FOR 
SELECTED SERVICES 3–4 (2007). 
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ities and, in the process, replace low-wage jobs with benefits 
and protections with jobs that are far worse. 
Privatization was originally intended to promote quality 
and lower cost by bringing the discipline of competition and 
market pressure to bear.158 These forces are absent in the case 
of a nonprofit organization such as ServiceSource. There was 
no competition to get the work, and, as a nonprofit organiza-
tion, ServiceSource is so highly subsidized that it has an unfair 
advantage when competing with truly private companies. With 
no market and no real competition, the forces that are supposed 
to drive accountability and lead to better performance at less 
cost are absent. As a result, in both the private and public sec-
tor, ServiceSource and similar contractors become not a driver 
for better performance, but a force to drive down wages.  
It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that 
nonprofit organizations such as ServiceSource are created in 
response to real problems. Taking away ServiceSource’s public 
subsidies would leave it not only unable to compete for these 
jobs, but unable to operate programs intended to address the 
problems facing people with disabilities. 
Replacing the complex and expensive system we now have 
that gives nonprofit organizations an incentive to become an 
employer-contractor with a targeted system would also address 
the perverse incentives nonprofit organizations now have not to 
find mainstream work for their clients. In its 2005 report, the 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions 
stated that “[t]here are no financial incentives to mainstream 
persons with disabilities.”159 Clients of nonprofit organizations 
such as ServiceSource are better served by being employed in 
mainstream jobs, jobs such as those in the IRS mailrooms be-
fore privatization. While not the focus of this study, it seems 
worth considering whether government subsidies aimed at 
moving workers into mainstream jobs might play a positive 
 
 158. See Dannin, supra note 14, at 117–18. 
 159. REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN ON FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR EMPLOYMENT 
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR & 
PENSIONS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR TOO FEW? OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL EMPLOY-
MENT PROGRAMS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 11 (2005), available at 
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_10_20/O&I_pdf.pdf. It also found that 
some nonprofit executives were exploiting JWOD contracts for personal finan-
cial gain. It found “numerous examples of excessive executive compensation, 
lavish perquisites, conflicts of interest and self-dealing.” Id. The report con-
cluded that JWOD and related programs have failed to achieve their stated 
missions. See id. at 12–13. 
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role, but not as they are now structured. Perhaps subsidies 
would be more effective if they were targeted at encouraging 
employers—public and private—to hire people with disabilities, 
and directed towards the costs of providing workplace accom-
modations. Such targeted subsidies would keep employer labor 
costs the same whether a worker had disabilities or not, and 
would allow job candidates to compete on a level playing field. 
Each of these issues—privatization, the role of nonprofit 
organizations, and the need to support the integration of people 
with disabilities into meaningful work—are complex and too 
long ignored. It is necessary to take a hard but fair look at each 
of them, amass meaningful data, and then assess how best we 
should proceed. 
